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ABSTRACT
In The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services, Richard Suss-
kind predicts that lawyers will suffer the fate of other guild-members—the artisans
and craftsman of an earlier age—who saw their livelihoods wiped out by the potent
mix of technological advancement and market forces that is modernity.  He argues
that the commoditization of legal services will make much traditional legal work
unnecessary, dramatically reducing the demand for the one-on-one client service that
has sustained the growth of the legal profession.  This Review challenges Susskind’s
assumption that the work of lawyers is analogous to the work of the mechanical
craftsmen of previous eras and questions his failure to consider the political and
legal factors that support the traditional legal profession.  Susskind offers no evi-
dence to support his claim that greater automation of legal work will result in less
demand for human legal services.  In fact, the evidence suggests that productivity
increases in knowledge industries increase demand for those knowledge goods.  And
Susskind never discusses professional considerations such as malpractice, conflicts
of interest, and confidentiality that serve to reify the traditional order and limit the
transformative power of technological change.
The Great Recession brought unprecedented dislocation to the legal pro-
fession.  In March 2009, the New York Times reported that a “wave of layoffs
ha[d] crashed upon the legal industry,” citing Bureau of Labor Statistics data
showing thousands of legal jobs lost as the recession lingered.1  By the end of
the year, according to the blog Law Shucks, more than twelve thousand people
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1 Michael J. de la Merced, The Legal Profession Feels the Pain of the Recession, N.Y.
TIMES, March 26, 2009, at F2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/business/26
law.html.
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had been laid off from major law firms, including at least 4,600 attorneys.2
Hiring of law students to lucrative summer positions slowed to a trickle, while
many new lawyers already in the pipeline had their start dates deferred by a
year or more.  Several large firms, including Thacher, Proffitt & Wood; Thelen
Reid & Priest; and Heller Ehrman, simply closed up shop, their lawyers left
scrambling to find empty chairs before the music stopped.3  Previous recessions
in the early 1990s and early 2000s had caused job losses, but this was a new
level of devastation.
Into this maelstrom British legal scholar Richard Susskind dropped his
book The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services.4  Susskind
had written an earlier book, The Future of Law, in which he detailed the ways
in which technology was changing the legal profession. 5  He followed that up
with a collection of essays titled Transforming the Law: Essays on Technology,
Justice and the Legal Marketplace, that touched on many of the same themes
of technological upheaval.6  The new book is a sequel, but also much more; it
is a bold prediction that lawyers will suffer the fate of other guild-members—
the artisans and craftsman of an earlier age—who saw their livelihoods wiped
out by the potent mix of technological advancement and market forces that is
modernity.  It created a stir, with a prepublication online dialog hosted by the
Times of London drawing reaction from the co-chief of DLA Piper and the
general counsels of Barclay’s and Cisco Systems, among other legal lumi-
naries.7  Susskind also found audiences on this side of the Atlantic, with speak-
ing engagements that included a turn at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet
& Society and the keynote address at the 2009 American Bar Association
Techshow.
Susskind’s book seems timely.  The anxiety caused by the recession led to
widespread navel-gazing in both the legal profession and the legal academy.
For years, lawyers had been hearing dire warnings about the outsourcing of
legal services to India,8 and it was starting to seem obvious that the old ways of
2 The Year in Law Firm Layoffs, LAW SHUCKS (Jan. 3, 2010), http://lawshucks.com/2010/
01/the-year-in-law-firm-layoffs-2009/.
3 Caryn Tamber, Riding Out the Downturn: Even for Big Firms, the Soft Market Could Turn
into a Shakeout, DAILY RECORD (Maryland), June 8, 2009, at 9B, available at http://find
articles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_20090608/ai_n31966323/.
4 See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?  RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES (2008).
5 See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1996).
6 See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE LAW: ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGY,
JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL MARKETPLACE (2000).
7 Frances Gibb, Will Lawyers Exist in 100 Years? Join the Debate, TIMES (London), Oct.
23, 2007, at 1 (Features), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/system/topicRoot/
The_End_of_Lawyers/ (scroll down to “Other Views”).
8 See Heather Timmons, Due Diligence from Afar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at B1, availa-
ble at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980CE3D6123EF936A3575BC0A966
9D8B63; David Lat & Elie Mystal, Outsourcing: What Indian Firms Have Planned for the
Future of Biglaw, ABOVE THE LAW (June 9, 2009), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/06/out
sourcing-what-indian-firms-have-planned-for-the-future-of-biglaw/; Jonathan D. Glater,
Even Law Firms Join the Trend to Outsourcing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, C7, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/13/business/13law.html.
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doing business—with large, heavily leveraged law firms racking up billable
hours and paying junior associates more than federal judges—could not survive
in a new world of enforced austerity.  A variety of articles have appeared in
legal journals over the last year and a half predicting fundamental changes for
the legal profession and for the legal academy.9  The time appears ripe for a
lucid and forward-thinking account of what the next generation of lawyers can
expect from their careers.
Unfortunately, that is not what Susskind has delivered.  His book is so
enamored with technology that it ignores the economic, political, and, indeed,
legal factors that operate to stifle change and preserve the status quo.  If we are
on the verge of an “end of lawyers,” Susskind has not explained why.
I. THE SUSSKIND MODEL OF LEGAL EVOLUTION
Susskind’s principal thesis is that the provision of legal services either is
or will become “commoditized,” in the same way that goods once produced by
craftsmen have become commoditized, and this will demolish the legal profes-
sion as we know it.  At the center of his argument is his model of how legal
services evolve to a state of commoditization.  He contends that legal work is
proceeding through an evolution of five stages: bespoke, standardized, sys-
tematized, packaged, and commoditized.10 Bespoke legal work involves “tradi-
tional, hand-crafted, one-to-one consultative professional service.”11  This is
the classic representation of the lawyer’s craft: a client walks into a lawyer’s
office, describes a particular problem needing legal assistance, and the lawyer
creates a legal product for that client from scratch. Standardized legal work
involves the creation of efficiencies derived from bespoke work.12  Lawyers
create templates, cannibalize documents, and reuse previous work product, but
still within the context of providing particularized service to specific clients.
Systemization simply takes the next step, using technology to automate aspects
of office work, such as creating a document from a computerized checklist.13
The systematization Susskind has in mind here is for internal use by the law-
yers, and so does not significantly change the actual delivery of legal work
product to the client.
These first three stages of evolution seem unremarkable.  Any lawyer
familiar with a modern law practice does these things.  They have become
widespread, and have not brought on any radical change in the legal profession.
9 See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Bounda-
ries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2138-39 (2010);
Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal
Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598, 599 (2010); Erin J. Cox, An
Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Reforming the Business of Law for a Sustain-
able and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REV. 511, 511 (2009).
10 SUSSKIND, supra note 4, at 29.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 29-30.
13 Id. at 30.
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The number of licensed attorneys and the income of attorneys have only grown
over the last few decades of rapid technological advancement.14
The profound changes Susskind envisions would flow from the last two
evolutionary steps: first to packaged legal services and finally to commoditiza-
tion. Packaged legal services are essentially just systematized legal services,
but, instead of being used internally, they are provided to clients so that the
clients can complete the work themselves.15  An example Susskind gives is of a
firm providing a client an electronic document assembly program that would
allow the client to generate its own employment contracts.16  Packaged services
are offered to specific clients for a fee or through a license.  That is fundamen-
tally how they differ from commoditized legal services.  A legal commodity is
“an electronic or online legal package or offering that is perceived as a com-
monplace, a raw material that can be sourced from one of various suppliers.”17
In other words, legal commodities are offered on a generic basis to anyone who
cares to purchase them, just like toothpaste or lawnmowers.  Susskind cites
“material found on legal websites” (Lexis and Westlaw perhaps?) as legal
commodities.18
The evolution through these last two stages would be significant, if it
occurred on a large scale, because it would indicate that legal services are going
through the same modernizing meat grinder that eliminated the need for milli-
ners, wheelwrights, and colliers.  In Susskind’s view of the future, a few highly
skilled practitioners will retain the role of “expert trusted adviser,”19 but most
lawyers will fill a far more fungible role—working within large organizations
to create and support the online distribution of large quantities of standardized
and commoditized legal services.20  Notwithstanding the title of Susskind’s
book, he is not actually predicting the end of lawyers.  Rather, he is predicting
the end of most legal work as we know it, with most lawyers assuming a new
role closer to that of information technician than attorney and counselor.
II. REALITY, OR MERELY THEORY?
One glaring problem with Susskind’s thesis is the lack of actual examples
of successfully commoditized legal services.  Susskind offers two “case stud-
ies” to show the progression through stages four and five—through packaged
and commoditized legal services.  Unfortunately, neither is particularly
convincing.
14 See Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution or
Revolution? 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1853-55 (2008) (describing relationship between
technological trends and the development of the modern law firm); Andrew Bruck &
Andrew Canter, Supply, Demand, and the Changing Economics of Large Law Firms, 60
STAN. L. REV. 2087, 2088-89 (2008).
15 SUSSKIND, supra note 4, at 31.
16 Id. at 31.
17 Id. at 31-32.
18 Id. at 32.
19 Id. at 271.
20 Id. at 271-72.
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The first example of potential commoditization is Susskind’s own lec-
tures.21  Susskind charges a fee for his speaking engagements.  But he could
also offer the same lectures by webcast on a subscription basis to anyone who
chose to buy them.  He could make lots of money that way, but would also be
subject to market pressures from anyone else who could offer comparable web
lectures at lower prices.  Commoditization!
Of course, the reason Susskind could package and commoditize his lec-
tures is that . . . they are all exactly the same.  It makes no difference who the
audience is, they get the same lecture.  No judgment calls need to be made
about whether this is the right lecture, at the right time, for the right people, to
accomplish some end.  And there is nothing that the audience needs to do on
the other end of the lecture to derive value from it.  His lectures are really no
different from any other static source of information.
Static legal information has been commoditized for years.  Generalized
legal knowledge has long been widely available online through Westlaw, Lex-
isNexis, FindLaw, and other services.  Even many sample legal documents are
already widely available through form books and other practice guides.  For
that matter, businesses that have used attorneys more than a handful of times
already have documents they could cannibalize to create new work product.
They could have a team of in-house legal specialists whose job is to take the
product supplied by legal providers and use it to do legal work in-house.
Because the firm would be doing its own work, there would be no requirement
that these people be licensed attorneys, although they would need much of the
specialized knowledge that attorneys have.  They could have gotten that knowl-
edge through ways other than graduation from law school followed by bar pas-
sage followed by experience.  They could, therefore, cost less than licensed
attorneys.  If that happened on a wide scale, it could spell dramatic changes in
the demand for traditional legal services (although not quite the end of
lawyers).
This has not happened, though, and I think the reason is that specialization
is efficient.  Even with the technological shortcuts widely available, legal work
remains relatively labor-intensive.  Most businesses do not want to employ
large numbers of people whose job is to do that kind of work.  They want to
employ people who contribute directly to the output of the business.  They
would prefer to hire specialists to address particular legal issues as needed.
When businesses have litigation, they hire a firm to do litigation.  When they
need to do the legal work required to finance a new project, they hire a firm
with expertise in that kind of work.  When they have to prosecute a patent, they
hire a firm to do it.  The commoditization of static legal information has not
changed the nature of legal work in any profound way.
So Susskind’s lectures are, to put it gently, an inapposite “case study” of
legal commoditization.  Fine.  Let us look for better examples of the commodi-
tization of legal work.  Susskind’s second case study is tax work.22  This one
comes closer to the mark.  He describes the Abacus corporate tax compliance
system developed by Arthur Andersen and licensed to corporations to allow
21 Id. at 53.
22 Id. at 54.
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them to calculate their own corporate tax liability in-house.23  This service has
not been commoditized, yet, because there is no competition in the market
among generic corporate tax compliance services.  Deloitte purchased Abacus
in the wake of Andersen’s collapse and licenses it to corporations.  This is an
example of packaged legal services in Susskind’s construct, not of commodi-
tized legal services.24  In the area of personal taxation, however, commoditiza-
tion has occurred, with market leader TurboTax competing with rivals,
including Microsoft and other companies, to provide generic tax preparation
software.  (Susskind does not mention these; perhaps they are not widely used
in England.)
But tax compliance is still not a particularly good example.  We have
known for decades that much tax compliance work does not need expert legal
guidance.  Tax preparation is not even considered the practice of law in the
United States.25  Accountants took over the bulk of tax compliance work long
ago, and H&R Block in effect commoditized routine personal tax return prepa-
ration beginning in the 1950s.  Technological rivals like TurboTax have hurt
H&R Block much more than lawyers.
Other examples might have served Susskind better.  A variety of services
already allow people to create basic legal documents online.  LegalZoom, for
example, is an online service allowing people to create wills, draft incorpora-
tion documents, and do other basic legal documentation through an online
interface at a set price.26  Susskind does not mention these services, perhaps
because they are not widely used in the corporate world, which is really Suss-
kind’s target.  In the section of his book on dispute resolution, he does briefly
discuss a service called Cybersettle, which has become the most successful
attempt at online dispute resolution (ODR).27  Cybersettle is an online double-
blind bidding system, in which the parties to a dispute submit three different
amounts of money for their demands or offers.  The program alerts them if their
numbers overlap, at which point a live person can step in to help finalize a
settlement.  Cybersettle’s biggest client, by far, is New York City, which uses it
to help resolve personal injury claims against the city.  The New York City
Comptroller reports that the service has helped reduce the city’s backlog of
claims from 77,000 to 10,000.28
Cybersettle would appear to be a functional example of a commoditized
legal service.  In a sense, it is, although not in the way Susskind seems to
imagine.  This is an area in which I have some expertise, having taught a course
on civil litigation in New York for a number of years.  The reality is that
Cybersettle is used only for small cases—those worth about $50,000 or less.
New York City is inundated with these sorts of small claims, and it just does
23 Id. at 54-55.
24 Id. at 55.
25 See Katherine D. Black & Stephen T. Black, A National Tax Bar: An End to the Attor-
ney-Accountant Tax Turf War, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 17-23 (2004) (analyzing state case law
holding that preparation of tax returns does not constitute the practice of law).
26 See, e.g., LEGAL ZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
27 SUSSKIND, supra note 4, at 220.
28 See Douglas S. Malan, A Numbers Game: Online Settlement Negotiations Drive Green-
wich Business, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.ctlawtrib-une.
com/getarticle.aspx?id=36164.
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not have the resources to litigate them.29  The city needs to free itself of claims
that are not worth the cost of defending.  So it has an incentive to settle small
claims quickly.  The problem is, New York City is an enormous bureaucracy,
and it can be very difficult to get someone to sign off on a settlement.  Claims
tend to pile up, because no one wants to be responsible for making the decision
to pay them.  Cybersettle helps because it provides cover for the city to settle.
But it does not change anything about the litigation or the attorneys’ relation-
ship.  Claimants’ attorneys tell me they still work out a settlement number with
the city’s attorneys first, and then they plug that number into Cybersettle.  The
program itself is just an add-on.  Human attorneys do everything that really
matters, and depend on their relationships and judgment.  Cybersettle is a form
of commoditization, albeit one that has very limited applicability.
Most of the other examples Susskind dwells upon are better understood as
examples of packaging.  For instance, he cites the “Blue Flag” service devel-
oped by Linklaters.30  Blue Flag is an online guide to regulatory compliance
and other financial matters that Linklaters offers to its clients.  Susskind sug-
gests that services like Blue Flag offer a substitute for some of what lawyers
do, and may thus cut them out of the supply chain.31  As of now, however,
these sorts of online offerings have not resulted in significant changes in the
way Linklaters or other law firms do their business.  Blue Flag is an add-on.
Like other firms creating online services, Linklaters offers the service to its
existing clients, not to the market at large.  And the service is limited to static
information.  Through this online portal, the firm provides its clients its raw
expertise, but not situation-specific guidance on its application or the work-
product that would result.32
Transformative change in the legal profession will come with widespread
commoditization of actual legal guidance, as opposed to static information or
rote processing.  It will come when and if an individual or firm needing an
answer to a legal problem can log into a service, input a set of facts, and press a
button to get an opinion on how to proceed, and then press another button to
create the necessary documentation.  It is theoretically possible that a computer
program could offer sophisticated and nuanced legal advice on situation-spe-
cific matters, and that an online service could provide that advice at a price
much lower than individual lawyers could.  This is what Susskind seems to
have in mind when he talks about a future in which citizens turn to the Internet
for legal guidance, “[w]hether through primitive FAQs (frequently asked ques-
tions) or artificial intelligence-based, diagnostic expert systems.”33
True artificial intelligence, capable of mimicking the work a human would
do, is still far from our technological grasp.  Susskind does not offer concrete
examples of these kinds of commoditization of legal guidance because they do
not yet exist.  Susskind’s real reason for thinking the end of lawyers is near is
29 See Allen R. Myerson, Soaring Liability Payments Burdening New York, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1992, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/29/nyregion/soaring-
liability-payments-burdening-new-york.html.
30 SUSSKIND, supra note 4, at 103.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 Id. at 242.
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his faith in technological progress and his belief that the legal profession is a
craft guild subject to the same evolutionary forces as other craft guilds.  He
sees it as inevitable that the technological problems will be solved and that
lawyers will then see their guild-based profession swallowed up just like previ-
ous mechanical craft guilds were demolished by the Industrial Revolution.
I am willing to stipulate that the technological problems can be solved to
the extent that relatively sophisticated, interactive, specific online legal gui-
dance will one day be available through a transparent market.  Will that really
spell the end of the legal profession as we know it?  I am still not sure.
Susskind’s thesis depends on two analogies: lawyers to mechanical
craftsmen, and knowledge and information to tangible goods.34  These analo-
gies may not hold, for two reasons.  First, the “guild” of lawyers is supported
by a superstructure of regulatory and legal protections that no other guild in
history has had.  Second, we cannot be certain that technological innovation
will have the same impact on knowledge-based industries like law that indus-
trial innovation had on the mechanical crafts.
III. POLITICS, LAW, AND . . . DID I MENTION POLITICS?
Guild behavior is a form of rent-seeking.  Guilds use legal restrictions on
the right to ply their trades to limit competition and prop up prices.  Bar
associations are legal guilds that limit competition through licensure backed by
legal proscriptions on the unauthorized practice of law.35
The craft guilds to which Susskind analogizes the legal profession have
lost their legal protections.36  Lawyers have not, for one very simple reason:
Most of the people in a position to do something about restrictions on the prac-
tice of law are themselves lawyers.  All judges and a majority of state and
federal legislators are lawyers.  They have all profited well from the rent-seek-
ing of the legal profession and have little motivation to eliminate it.
Susskind’s vision of the future does not directly implicate the licensing
regime that protects lawyers.  In the world he imagines, lawyers will provide
commoditized legal services, with clients using the information provided to
them to create their own legal work product.  Lawyers will create templates,
checklists and sample documents, provide in-depth legal research and analysis,
and even construct interactive guidance and document creation programs, all of
which will be available online for a fee.  Those in need of legal product will
buy this information and then do the work themselves, much of it through auto-
mated systems.
What Susskind ignores is the set of legal limits on the practice of law that
exists within this regulatory structure.  Consider a scenario involving the kind
of commoditized legal work Susskind seems to have in mind.  Assume a devel-
oper needs to know whether a particular project meets applicable zoning regu-
34 See id. at 4.
35 For an exegesis on the analogy between modern lawyers and pre-industrial craft guilds,
see Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 7-10, 14-16
(1993).
36 See SUSSKIND, supra note 4, at 4 (using Mercer’s Company as example of a disenfranch-
ised guild).
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lations.  A law firm creates an automated program that allows the developer to
respond to a series of questions about the location, the nature of the project, and
other relevant factors.  The program gives the developer an analysis of the zon-
ing implications of the project and concludes that a variance is needed.  With a
few more clicks, the program even creates the documentation necessary for the
variance application, along with instructions for how to file the application.
One initial problem is with the unauthorized practice of law.  LegalZoom,
the closest extant analog to the automated legal providers in Susskind’s brave
new world, is currently embroiled in litigation in a number of jurisdictions over
precisely this issue.37  To say the least, this is a slippery area of regulation, with
different states employing different standards for what constitutes the practice
of law, and many states offering no clear guidance at all.38  LegalZoom has
tried to avoid the problem by claiming that it is not providing legal advice.39
This is a tenuous position at best, and what Susskind has in mind goes even
further, with automated programs providing situation-specific legal advice.
There is little chance that the bar associations, backed by the courts, will aban-
don their rules on licensure, which almost certainly cover that kind of situation-
specific legal advice.40  So automated programs like my zoning example will
have to have real lawyers standing behind them, and will have to find a way to
meet the licensing requirements in any state where their online clients sit.
Let us just assume for the time being that any hurdles involving the unli-
censed practice of law can be overcome, and that the zoning program I just
described could be offered on a generic basis to clients in any state.  A devel-
oper uses the program to create the documentation required to seek his zoning
variance.  What happens next?  If the developer is lucky, the zoning board will
approve the variance without objection and without asking any difficult follow-
up questions.  In many cases, however, the process will not proceed that
smoothly.  Questions will arise.  Someone will challenge the variance.  The
developer will have to respond, and will need legal advice to do so.
37 See G.M. Filisko, Does Connecticut Hate the Net?:  State Is Battleground for Online
Legal Services, 95 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2010, at 31-33 (2010) (describing investigation by Con-
necticut Department of Consumer Protection into LegalZoom); Harry Styron, Legalzoom
.Com Sued in Missouri Class Action: Maybe Now We’ll Find Out What the Practice of Law
Really Is, OZARKS LAW & ECONOMY (Feb. 21, 2010), http://styronblog.com/?s=legalzoom;
Legal Zoom Is Alleged to Be Violating North Carolina’s Ethic Statute Governing the Unau-
thorized Practice of Law, THE GREATEST AM. LAW. (July 24, 2009), http://greatestamerican
lawyer.typepad.cpm/greatest_american_lawyer/2009/07/legal-zoom-is-alleged-to-be-violat-
ing-north-carolinas-ethic-statute-governing-the-unauthorized-practice-of-law.html.
38 See John Gibeaut, Another Try: ABA Task Force Takes a Shot at Defining the Practice of
Law, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 18.
39 See Disclaimer, LEGAL ZOOM, www.LegalZoom.com/disclaimer-popup.html (last visited
Jan. 8, 2011) (“LegalZoom is not a law firm, and the employees of LegalZoom are not acting
as your attorney.  LegalZoom’s legal document service is not a substitute for the advice of an
attorney.”).
40 See Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the
Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 161-62 (1999) (“[A]t least since the 1930s, bar opinions in a
variety of different contexts have asserted that furnishing more than generalized legal infor-
mation can create an attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and the questioner.  The
historical record also reflects that the regulatory responses to such conduct have often been
prompted by technological advances.”).
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Will the developer go back to the automated program for more automated
legal advice?  How likely is that to work?  Anyone who has ever dealt with
online services is aware of how frustrating it can be to get even straightforward
questions answered through an automated program.  This is why even the most
sophisticated technology companies, like Apple, rely heavily on human techni-
cal support, in the form of chats or twenty-four-hours-a-day call centers.  Per-
haps Susskind envisions a world in which artificial intelligence has advanced
so far that automated systems will be able to respond as effectively as humans
can to complex questions.  That day seems a long way away.
What seems more realistic in the near-to-medium term is that the law firm
that developed the zoning program could offer chats or phone support, just like
other providers of Internet goods and services currently offer.41  It would have
to employ lawyers for that task to avoid problems with the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.  Protected by the guild system, any one-to-one advice on legal
matters will have to be done by licensed attorneys.  In theory, however, the
firm could achieve great economies of scale, and could even outsource that
work to (cheaper) lawyers in foreign countries (India) who have either JDs or
LLM degrees from American law schools and have passed a bar exam in the
relevant state.42  This would still mean much less high-paying work for Ameri-
can lawyers, right?
There are other significant hurdles here that Susskind never addresses.
The hurdles take the shape of legal and ethical rules involving malpractice,
confidentiality, and conflicts of interest.  And when I say he never addresses
them, I mean that literally. He never mentions them at all.  There are no index
entries in the book for malpractice, confidentiality, or conflicts.  That is a mon-
umental oversight.  Although concerns about malpractice, confidentiality, and
conflicts might not entirely doom the commoditization thesis, they almost cer-
tainly will play a very significant, and very restricting, role in the actual com-
moditization of actual legal work.  Here are a few ways these concerns could
impact the automation of legal services.
A. Malpractice
Defending and paying malpractice claims can be a very expensive pro-
position, even with malpractice insurance.  Assume in my developer/zoning
example that someone challenges the variance and the developer goes back to
the provider of the online zoning program for follow-up advice.  A call-center
lawyer gives advice to the developer that turns out to be faulty in some signifi-
cant way.  The provider of the automated zoning program will be liable on any
41 Susskind might have something like this role in mind when he talks about a category of
lawyers he calls “the enhanced practitioner,” whose function is to “support[ ] the delivery of
standardized, systematized, and (when in-house) packaged legal service.” SUSSKIND, supra
note 4, at 271.
42 See Brian Miller, The Ethical Implications of Legal Outsourcing, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 259,
262 (2008) (“Legal service providers in India are more than capable of handling the sophisti-
cated legal work that is sent to them from U.S. law firms.  Many of these providers’ employ-
ees have LLMs from the best law schools in America.”).  There are also some indications
that the shortage of job prospects in the United States is pushing western lawyers to seek
their fortunes in India with legal outsourcing firms. See Timmons, supra note 8.
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resulting malpractice claim, giving the provider powerful incentives to avoid
malpractice liability.
This puts the provider in a situation not so different from the position of
any manufacturer of consumer goods.  If a product injures a consumer, the
manufacturer is liable.  But whereas a manufacturer of goods can standardize
the manufacturing process to minimize the likelihood of injuries, the provider
of online legal services must depend on the judgment and acumen of the indi-
vidual lawyers serving in the call-service role.  That means the provider will
need competent attorneys manning the call-centers and chat rooms.
As a result, competent attorneys will be in demand, and the cost of their
services will rise (even if they are located in India).  Compensation structures
will have to be worked out to pay for attorneys’ work.  One way or another,
clients will have to foot the bill.  This could happen through flat rates included
in the cost of the automated service, or it could be on an hourly basis.  Pressure
will grow to charge on an hourly basis for the same reason that law firms have
always charged on an hourly basis: they do not know at the start of the repre-
sentation how much work will be involved.
B. Confidentiality
Susskind’s automated legal world is built on a foundation of immense
trust.  Clients, many of whom will have very sensitive legal issues, will have to
type their problems into generic computer programs and wait for these pro-
grams to spit back anonymous advice.  This is not like buying products online,
or even like doing online banking.  With online banking, there is a risk of
straight theft.  Someone who gets access to my online bank account can steal
my money.  That is not an attractive prospect, but it is also relatively easy to
insure against.  The bank, backed by the federal government, can simply guar-
anty me against that kind of loss.  As long as I get my money back, I really do
not care that much.
The information I must disclose to get effective legal advice is not insura-
ble in that way.  If I have sensitive business information and my competitors
get access to it, I may suffer losses that are not compensable in any practicable
way.  If I am going to disclose important information, I want up-front guaran-
tees that it will not be revealed to third parties.
One way that confidentiality concerns are addressed is through the attor-
ney-client privilege.  The nascent law in this area suggests the attorney-client
privilege can arise from a purely online relationship, as long as the client is
seeking legal guidance.43  Let us assume the attorney-client privilege arises
whenever an attorney-client relationship arises, and that an attorney-client rela-
tionship arises whenever a client receives situation-specific legal guidance
through an online portal.44  This would give clients confidence that their online
disclosures would not be used against them in future civil or criminal litigation.
As I suggested, though, concerns about sensitive information go beyond the
43 See Richard L. Marcus, The Electronic Lawyer, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 295-98 (2009)
(analyzing case law on attorney-client privilege for online representation).
44 See Katy Ellen Deady, Cyberadvice: The Ethical Implications of Giving Professional
Advice over the Internet, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 898-99 (2001).
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litigation context.  Often, the mere disclosure of confidential information poses
an unacceptable risk.
Confidential information might be disclosed in a variety of ways.  There is
an obvious risk of breaches of confidentiality in the online system itself.  We
know that Internet security is not perfect, even for the United States govern-
ment and technology behemoths such as Google.45  Systems can be hacked,
data can be left unprotected accidentally, and glitches of all kinds can occur.
Law firms currently use e-mail and other technological platforms that are vul-
nerable to data loss in all these ways, yet clients still entrust sensitive informa-
tion to them.  These facts suggest that confidentiality concerns rooted in
technological vulnerability might prove relatively unimportant.
Potentially of greater significance is the risk of disclosure through human
failings.  When clients deal with law firms in the traditional way, they develop
relationships with human beings.  These relationships yield trust—or they do
not last.  It is the trust that clients have in their lawyers that leads them to
divulge sensitive information.  One human being gets to know another human
being, and comes to believe the latter will protect confidences now and into the
future.
When I type my information into an automated program, I have no idea
who will have access to it.  I am making a leap of faith that it will be protected
and will not end up in the possession of someone untrustworthy.  Assuming
clients were confident in the technological security of the program, they would
still likely hesitate to enter sensitive information in a generic program accessi-
ble to unknown individuals on the other end, some of whom might not even be
in America and subject to American law.
The confidentiality problem remains even at the stage of speaking with the
“customer service lawyer” on a chat or through a call center.  Yes, it would be
relatively straightforward to make the credentials of that lawyer accessible
online, and that would at least provide some assurance that the individual is an
actual lawyer covered by ethics rules requiring confidentiality.  However, the
personal relationship essential to trust will not exist—at least not unless the
client and the lawyer build a personal relationship similar to the ones clients
and lawyers have traditionally built.  The problem is that the degree of interac-
tion required to achieve this deep a relationship limits the economies of scale
that can be achieved, resulting in a system for providing legal services that
looks an awful lot like what we have now.
C. Conflicts of Interest
The ethical rules governing lawyers include severe restrictions on the abil-
ity of a lawyer or a law firm to give legal advice to multiple parties who have
or may have interests adverse to one another.46  These restrictions do not end
45 See John F. Burns, British Ruling Makes Hacker’s Extradition to U.S. More Likely, N.Y.
TIMES INT’L., Aug. 1, 2009, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/world/
europe/01britain.html (describing a case against a Briton who hacked U.S. military com-
puters); Andrew Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google May End Venture in China Over Censor-
ship, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/
world/asia/13beijing.html.
46 See  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2003).
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when the representation ends, because of the potential for a lawyer to retain
confidential information that could be used against former clients.  Absent dra-
matic changes in the regulation of legal services, providers of automated legal
services will be lawyers subject to ethical rules, including the rules governing
conflicts of interests.47  They will be barred from representing clients who are
adverse to current or former clients just as any other lawyer would.
Because of the conflicts rules, providers of automated legal services will
have to keep extensive records of their clients and of the matters they handle on
behalf of their clients.  Before accepting any new work, they will have to run
the extensive conflicts checks that law firms currently run before taking on new
clients and new matters.  This is a significant limitation.  Conflicts problems
regularly hinder the mergers of bricks-and-mortar law firms.48  In the same
way, the inevitable existence of conflicts will hinder the development of the
generic, widely available online legal services that Susskind envisions.
IV. INNOVATION, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
None of this is to say that technology will have no impact on the legal
profession.  Susskind is certainly correct that technological innovations will
change legal practice in important ways.  Some kinds of traditional legal work
will dry up.  Lawyers will no longer bill by the hour to draft routine legal
documents such as basic wills and incorporation documents; automated pro-
grams like LegalZoom will perform such services.  This has already started to
happen.  Its real effect on the legal profession is likely to be relatively small,
however.  For most people who use these kinds of low-end legal services, the
choice is rarely between paying an expensive attorney for customized service
and purchasing a generic online service.  The choice is between purchasing a
generic online service and foregoing legal assistance entirely.
The legal website Lawyers.com, a part of the technological revolution
with which Susskind is enamored, reports that a recent Harris Interactive sur-
vey showed that only thirty-five percent of Americans have wills.49  That
leaves millions of people who should probably have a will, but who were never
going to pay an attorney to prepare one.  These are the people likely to opt for
online will preparation.  People who have a lot of money at stake also have the
money to pay for particularized legal guidance.  These are the people who paid
for estate guidance before LegalZoom was a gleam in anyone’s eye, and they
are unlikely to trust their legacies to a software program anytime soon.  In large
47 See Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Ethics Op. 99-9, (1999) (requir-
ing that online representation “must be free from conflicts of interest.”).  Accordingly, the
Board advised that the client intake form must elicit information so that a traditional con-
flicts check can be performed. Id.
48 Nat Slavin, Examining the Downside of Merger Madness, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
2002, at 4 (“The greatest hurdle [merging] firms face is conflicts of interest . . . .  It can take
years for firms to sort out who represents whom, and more importantly, who has represented
whom.  Ultimately, this process can kill a merger either before it happens or after consum-
mation.”) (emphasis omitted).
49 See Lawyers.com Survey Reveals Drop in Estate Planning, LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 25,
2010), http://www.lawyers.com/understand-your-legal-issue/press-room/2010-Will-Survey-
Press-Release.html.
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measure, then, commoditization might create and satisfy a new demand for
legal services without cutting much into the work of existing lawyers.
At the higher end of the legal services spectrum, technology might very
well result in standardization of the type represented by Linklaters’ Blue Flag
system.  Law firms can increase productivity and save clients money by provid-
ing licensed, automated legal services backed by the firm’s professionals.  That
makes sense, and avoids the problems of malpractice, confidentiality, and con-
flicts that will hinder the growth of truly commoditized legal services.  That
and other technological developments could well allow fewer lawyers to do the
same amount of legal work.  For example, one of the main technological inno-
vations Susskind dwells upon is data sharing, along with its more sophisticated
cousin, knowledge sharing.  His idea is that technology will increasingly con-
join lawyer and client.  One example he points to is the “deal-room.”50 A deal
room is not what it sounds like.  It is simply an online repository of information
that is accessible by both attorney and client.  The law firm creates a secure
space online that houses all the documents for a particular transaction or law-
suit.  Clients can enter the deal room electronically to monitor work, retrieve
and modify documents, and communicate with their lawyers, giving clients
greater control over the legal product they are buying.
I think we can all agree that there is room for productivity gains from
these kinds of technological advances.  Firms that employ them should be able
to provide the same quantity of legal services to their clients using fewer attor-
neys, and at lower cost.  There is nothing particularly revolutionary in this.
Productivity gains like these occur in every industry and profession as a result
of technological innovation.  If history is any guide, they do not spell the end of
lawyers.  Past technological developments have coincided with—and arguably
made possible—the rapid evolution toward the large-scale legal practice that
Susskind believes is now endangered.51
To date, technological change has not put lawyers out of work in the way
it has put other types of craftsmen out of work.  The reason is that the output of
lawyers is different from the output of the mechanical craftsmen who saw their
livelihoods wiped out by modernization.  The output of lawyers is a stew of
intangibles consisting of expertise, judgment, process skills, and the like.
These “knowledge goods” are different from tangible goods.  Take a tangible
good that used to be made by craftsmen and is now mass-produced—say,
bread.  We all eat bread.  We used to eat bread made by bakers, organized into
guilds, like London’s Worshipful Company of Bakers.  Now we eat bread made
by multinational corporations using modern means of production.  Improve-
ments in efficiency have given us an enormous variety of breads to choose
from, and they are available at low prices from an enormous variety of retail
outlets.
All of that choice is wonderful, but there is a limit to my ability as a bread
consumer to take advantage of it.  I can only eat so much bread, and I have no
need to or interest in storing large quantities of bread.  After I eat my bread, my
need for bread is satisfied until the next time I want some bread.  Knowledge
50 SUSSKIND, supra note 4, at 40-41.
51 See Marcus, supra note 14, at 1853.
198 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:184
goods do not work that way.  Knowledge goods are not perishable.  They do
not require the maintenance of physical inventories.  More importantly, my use
of knowledge goods does not necessarily satiate my need for knowledge goods.
In fact, it often works the other direction.  The more I know, the more I might
need to know.
The commoditization of legal knowledge could actually increase the
demand for legal services.  For example, one of LegalZoom’s products is a
simple online incorporation program.  For a fee, anyone can input information
to create basic incorporation documents.  No lawyer is necessary to start up a
simple corporation.  On the one hand, this service makes unnecessary a type of
legal work that was almost exclusively the province of lawyers just a decade
ago, and so this is an example of how technological commoditization could eat
into the demand for one kind of customized legal work.  On the other hand, the
commoditization of incorporation could also create new demands for custom-
ized legal work.  The widespread availability of a simple incorporation process
will likely lead to the creation of more corporations.52  Corporations are legal
creations.  They exist solely in the imagination of the law.  Everything they do
happens within a complex web of legal and regulatory rules.  They literally
cannot function without legal guidance.  More corporations means more need
for legal services.
Cybersettle might be an even more-concrete example of commoditization
increasing traditional work for lawyers.  Cybersettle benefits New York City
because the city needs to dispose quickly of small claims that are not worth
defending.  In that way, it is good for the city.  It is also good for the claimants’
attorneys, who are typically working on a contingent fee and mostly want a
quick payout without consuming time and money in litigation.  Cybersettle’s
value thus lies in its capacity to shorten the time to settlement for a certain type
of dispute that was going to settle anyway.  In that way, it creates efficiency.
That efficiency, however, will not necessarily reduce the work for attor-
neys.  If Cybersettle makes it easier to get a quick settlement against New York
City for low-level claims, it might actually increase the number of claims filed
against the city.  One plaintiff’s attorney I spoke with recently told me that he
now takes claims that he previously would have considered too small to be
worth his time.  With litigation against the city becoming a more attractive
52 It is impossible to demonstrate empirically that the presence of LegalZoom and other
online incorporation services increases the number of incorporations.  It is clear, however,
that the number of incorporations grew rapidly in the years following LegalZoom’s launch in
2001.  For example, in California, about seventy thousand for-profit business and profes-
sional corporations were filed in 2001. 2002 Annual Report, INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL
ADM’R, 14, http://www.iaca.org/node/80 (follow “2002 Annual Report” hyperlink).  By
2007, that number had jumped to almost ninety-five thousand. 2007 Annual Report of Cali-
fornia, INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’R, http://www.iaca.org/node/80 (follow “2007
Annual Report” hyperlink, then select “United States” and “California” and click “Display
Report”).  Macroeconomic forces undoubtedly played the largest role in that trend (the num-
ber of incorporations dropped back to about seventy-one thousand in the recession year of
2009). 2009 Annual Report of California, INT’L ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’R, http://
www.iaca.org/node/80 (follow “2009 Annual Report” hyperlink, then select “United States”
and “California” and click “Display Report”).  But easy online incorporation surely did not
hurt.
Fall 2010] BOOK REVIEW 199
option, both claimants and their attorneys might be more willing to bring
smaller claims. Like other online legal services, Cybersettle could actually cre-
ate a market for certain kinds of legal work that had not been satisfied before.
That technological advances could increase the amount of traditional work
available to attorneys should not come as a total surprise.  Macroeconomic data
suggest that efficiency gains in knowledge-based industries do not have the
same effect that efficiency gains have in “hard” industries.  As a result of effi-
ciency gains, we need many fewer manufacturing workers now than we used to
need.  Between 2000 and 2008, the number of workers employed in manufac-
turing in the United States dropped from almost twenty million to just under
sixteen million—roughly a twenty percent decline.53  This happened even
though the gross domestic product attributed to manufacturing increased from
$1.4 trillion to $1.57 trillion in inflation-adjusted dollars.54  We produced more,
with fewer workers.
The trends are very different in knowledge-based industries.  The period
from 2000 to 2008 saw dramatic changes in information technology, including
all the technological developments Susskind reports.  Yet over that period, the
number of workers in professional and business services increased from 13.6
million to 15.5 million.55  The gross domestic product attributed to professional
services of all kinds increased over that period, as well, with professional, sci-
entific, and technical services increasing from $675 billion to $974 billion in
chained 2000 dollars.56  Developments in information technology seem to have
resulted in more information industry workers producing ever more
information.
Of course, lawyers might be different from other knowledge-based work-
ers.  Maybe lawyers are particularly susceptible to job losses from efficiency
gains.  Even if that were the case, though, the productivity gains Susskind
predicts would not result in the end of lawyers.  At most, they suggest that the
demand for lawyers might not keep pace with the demand for legal services.
The real question for lawyers is whether the demand for legal services will
grow fast enough to support the lawyers now in the profession and soon to
enter the profession, given the productivity gains on the putative horizon.
If only we knew the answer to that question.  Alas, we do not, and we
cannot.  Still, it seems highly unlikely that demand for legal services will not
grow.  There is an old saying: no food, one problem; much food, many
problems.  Much of the world’s population struggles to find enough food.  We
have plenty of food.  We also have plenty of automobiles, plenty of amusement
parks, plenty of joint venture agreements, and plenty of heart bypass surgeries.
With this increasing societal complexity comes increasing problems.  In a cul-
53 The 2010 Statistical Abstract, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), http://www.census.gov/com-
pendia/statab/2010/2010edition.html (follow “Section 12: Labor Force, Employment, and
Earnings” hyperlink, then scroll down to Table 607) [hereinafter 2010 Statistical Abstract,
Table 607].
54 The 2010 Statistical Abstract, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), http://www.census.gov/com-
pendia/statab/2010/2010edition.html (follow “Section 13: Income, Expenditures, Poverty,
and Wealth” hyperlink, then scroll down to Table 654) [hereinafter 2010 Statistical Abstract,
Table 654].
55 The 2010 Statistical Abstract, Table 607, supra note 53.
56 The 2010 Statistical Abstract, Table 654, supra note 54.
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ture as heterogeneous as ours, these problems must be resolved by resort to
legal rules.  Unless we face some kind of structural societal collapse, demand
for legal services will continue to grow.
Calling his book The End of Lawyers? is a provocative gesture; Susskind
can be forgiven for seeking to provoke.  Provocation sells, and he wants his
book to be read and talked about like any author does.  I get that.  And to be
fair, Susskind makes clear that he does not truly believe the end of lawyers is
imminent.  But he really, truly, does believe that technology will shift the para-
digm in ways that will make legal practice nearly unrecognizable.  This book,
unfortunately, does not come close to supporting that case.  At most, the book
makes the case that technology is and will increasingly improve the productiv-
ity of lawyers, and will allow for the commodization of certain kinds of routine
legal services—those that are not especially complex, do not require ongoing
follow-through, and do not involve the disclosure of highly sensitive or confi-
dential information.  Whether those developments will actually result in a sig-
nificant decline in the need for individualized lawyer-client relationships is an
open question, and one Susskind has not really attempted to answer.
